Security and end-to-end encryption
We use an open-source messaging protocol and libraries to provide private communication. The operator must verify that this claim reflects the actual deployed service, not just a software plan. Until E2EE has been implemented and tested end to end, this page must show a clear development/not-yet-verified status rather than an unconditional security promise.
How message content is protected
When enabled and verified, conversations are encrypted on the participants' devices using Matrix and its maintained Rust-based cryptography before encrypted events are delivered to our self-hosted homeserver. Decryption takes place on recipient devices holding the appropriate keys. The intended design does not give administrators a method to centrally read message plaintext.
Inspect the software
- Matrix JavaScript SDK: https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk
- Rust cryptography implementation: https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-rust-sdk (matrix-sdk-crypto)
- Synapse homeserver: https://github.com/element-hq/synapse
- Matrix specification: https://spec.matrix.org/
Deployed SDK/crypto/Synapse versions and source commit hashes: Synapse 1.163.2; matrix-js-sdk 45.0.0; @matrix-org/matrix-sdk-crypto-wasm 18.9.0. Source commit hashes have not been checked; these versions do not constitute an independent audit.. Public upstream code can be inspected, but that alone is not a third-party audit of this website, its deployment, browser environment or runtime keys.
Information still visible
Encrypted contents do not hide from the service the registered email/account, supplier identity, which users are communicating, room IDs, message times and sizes, access entitlement period, payment event status, verification records, ordinary operational logs, and information intentionally published on profiles. Service operators and infrastructure providers may process these metadata under the Privacy policy.
Device keys, recovery and limits
Your device stores cryptographic identity/key material. The current development client has no key backup or recovery flow. Changing browsers, clearing local storage or losing a phone/computer may make historic messages unreadable. Device verification is not yet available in this interface. A conversation recipient may screenshot, copy, forward or voluntarily report its contents. E2EE does not protect against infected devices, phishing, misidentification of a counterparty or illegal conduct. We cannot guarantee that transactions conducted independently of this service are safe.
Security contact
Report a vulnerability to contact@pharmspan.com. Abuse or impersonation can also be reported at Report content. If you submit a plaintext excerpt or decryption key to support, it is no longer confidential to that recipient; do not submit private keys unnecessarily.